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CASE COMMENT
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
A Retreat From Equal Protection
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society . . . . In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.'
W ITH THESE WORDS, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education,2 unanimously declared that the long-standing, state-
enforced doctrine of "separate but equal" denied equal protection of
the laws to non-white pupils in state-supported schools. Recognizing
the fundamental importance of an education in modern society3 and
finding that "[s]eparate education facilities are inherently unequal,"4
the Court ruled that a state could no longer make the extent of a
child's educational opportunity a function of the color of his skin.
Nineteen years later, the Supreme Court was called upon in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezs to review the
constitutionality of another long-standing, state-enforced practice of
affecting education. This time the challenge was to the Texas scheme
of financing public elementary and secondary education. This scheme,
and those in nearly every state, relied primarily upon local ad valorem
property taxes, and resulted in great disparities between school dis-
tricts in the amount of funds available for educational expenditures.
6
Unlike Brown, Rodriguez was not unanimously decided. The
Court split 5-4 in reversing the decision of the district court and in
upholding the constitutionality of the Texas financing system. The
paradox of the majority's decision is evidenced by this statement
from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart:
The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in
almost every other State, has resulted in a system of public
education that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust.
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Id. at 493.
SId. at 495.
U.S.. 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973).
'Id. at 1287.
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It does not follow, however, and I cannot find, that this sys-
ten violates the Constitution of the United States.'
In so finding, the Supreme Court has now ruled that a state may
make the extent of a child's educational opportunity a function of
the assessed valuation of the taxable real property located within
the school district in which he happens to live.
Before exploring the narrow confines of the Court's reasoning
in Rodriguez, it will be helpful to look briefly at some of the major
cases that preceded this decision. The number of these decisions over
a relatively short period of time,' the similarities in reasoning among
them, and the reactions they caused,9 all combine to show that the
school financing issue was not only very important but was also
highly controversial.
The first major cases to challenge the constitutionality of a state's
method of financing its public schools are noteworthy mainly for
their lack of success. In the first of these, McInnis v. Shapiro,'" the
plaintiffs, in challenging the Illinois school financing scheme, claimed
that only a financing system that apportioned public funds accord-
ing to the educational needs of the students satisfies the fourteenth
amendment. 1 The three-judge district court that heard the case,
though recognizing the readily apparent inequalities in the system,"
found "no Constitutional requirements that public school expendi-
tures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs.' 3" An
attack upon the constitutionality of the Virginia school financing
scheme met the same fate the following year in Burruss v. Wilker-
son.1" Even though the district court judge who first heard the case
found merit in the plaintiffs' arguments,15 the three-judge court sub-
sequently impaneled found this case to be "scarcely distinguishable"' 6
7Id. at 1310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
8 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 197 1); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d
457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N-J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
'See, e.g., Flaherty, Serrano: Its progeny and Its Prophecy, 21 CLEVE.ST.L.REv. 104 (Sept.
1972); Vieria, Unequal Edncasional Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v.
Priett, 37 Mo.L.REv. 617 (1972).
10293 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. I1. 1968), aff'd mew., sub nom., Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969).
" McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
121d.
'
31d. at 336.
14310 F.Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd warn., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
's Burruss v. Wilkerson, 301 F.Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1968).
1"Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969), a'd wrem., 397 U.S. 44(1970).
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from Mclnnis, and dismissed the action. Since both of these cases
were affirmed by the Supreme Court in per curiam opinions,1" the
record in the school funding cases at that time was not a good one
from a plaintiff's point of view.
The outlook for success improved somewhat in March, 1971,
when the Supreme Court, in Askew v. Hargrave,"' vacated the de-
cision of the three-judge district court in Hargrave v. Kirk which
had declared unconstitutional a Florida millage rollback plan. In
remanding the case to await the outcome of a state constitutional
challenge to that plan, the Court expressly left open the issue of the
merit of an equal protection claim.2
About the same time that those cases were going through the
courts, three law review articles1 and a book2' appeared which would
prove to be very influential in subsequent school financing cases. It
is beyond the scope of this Comment to review those publications,
but their importance cannot be underestimated. Their appearance at
this time provided the final ingredients necessary for success. It was
the uniting of the analysis, reasoning, and arguments contained in
them, with the opportunity presented by Askew to avoid the hold-
ings in McInnis and Burruss, that produced the seed of an idea that
now was ready to germinate. All that was lacking was a fertile setting
in which this idea could take root and flourish and from which it
could propagate itself.
The fertile setting was soon found in the California Supreme
Court; and it was there, in the case of Serrano v. Priest,21 that the
idea became law. In that celebrated case, the California court directed
the trial court to overrule the defendants' general demurrer, holding
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in alleging that the
California public school financing system violated his constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws. 24 In so ruling, the court wrote
a detailed decision in which, inter alia, it found that:
1 Bursuss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aff'g mem., 310 F.Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969);
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g mem., Mclnnis v. Shaplio, 293 F.Supp. 327
(N.D. il. 1968).
18401 U.S. 476 (1971).
"313 F.Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated and remanded, sub nom., Askew v. Hargrave,
401 U.S. 476 (1971).
2 0 Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478-79 (1971).
21 Coons, Clone, Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for
State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF.L.REv. 305 (1969); Michelman, Forward: On Protect-
ing the Poor Through the Fourteentb Amendment, 893 HARv.L.REV. 7 (1969); Note, De-
velopments - Equal Protection, 82 HARV.L.REV. 1067 (1969).
" J. COONS, W. CLUNE, S. SUGARMAN, PRvATE WEALTH AD PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
2 5 Cal. 3rd 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971).
7Al1d. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 626.
19731
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1) Wealth is a suspect classification."
2) Discrimination on the basis of district wealth is as invalid as
that based on individual wealth.2 6
3) The extent to which governmental action was the cause of the
wealth classification made this more than mere de facto dis-
crimination.2 7
4) The constitutionality of this legislative classification had to
be determined by its effect, not its purpose.0
5) Education is a fundamental interest which may not be con-
ditioned on wealth.
9
6) The California school financing system was not necessary to
accomplish a compelling state interest and, therefore, could not
withstand the requisite "strict scrutiny" test of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause."
7) The California system which relied heavily on local property
taxes and resulted in substantial disparities among school dis-
tricts in available educational revenues invidiously discriminated
against the poor and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.
3
'
The seeds of Serrano quickly spread across the nation and took
root in almost every state in which they fell? 2 The consistent theme
of these cases came to be that "the level of spending for the child's
education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state as a whole."3 This principle, generally referred to as "fiscal
neutrality," 4 does not require absolute uniformity of school expen-
ditures," nor does it require a state legislature to adopt a specific
system of financing or taxation. 6 Under the principle of fiscal neu-
'lid. at 597-98,487 P.2d at 1250,96 Cal.Rptr. at 610.
2lId. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 612.
2 Id. at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 614.
" id. at 602-03,487 P.2d at 1253-54, 96 Cal.Rpt. at 613-14.
2I. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258,96 Cal.Rptr. at 618.
301d. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 620.
31 Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 604.
32 See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San An-
tonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Milliken v. Green, 389
Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187
(1972).
33 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W.D Tex, 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118
N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (1972).
34 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
'sMilliken v. Green, 389 Midi. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457, 472 (1972); Van Dusatz v. Hatfield,
334 F.Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971).
36 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 NJ. Super. 223,287 A.2d 187, 217 (1972).
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trality, "the State remains free to pursue all imaginable interests ex-
cept that of distributing education according to wealth." 37
One of the courts in which the Serrano reasoning flourished was
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
That court, in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dis-
triert,3 decided that the Texas system of school financing violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause since Texas had
been unable to show that the system was premised upon some com-
pelling state interest. 9 The court further concluded that the defend-
ants had failed to establish even a reasonable basis for the classifi-
cations 0 Although the three-judge court that heard and decided this
case was impaneled in January, 1969, it postponed its decision until
December, 1971, in order to give the Texas legislature an opportunity
to correct the inequities in its school funding scheme. Only after the
legislature had adjourned without taking any action, did the court
issue its decision and order. 41
It was against this background of general state and federal
court acceptance of the Serrano decision, that the Supreme Court
decided to hear an appeal from the district court's ruling in Rod-
riguez v. San Antonio Independent School District.2 An analysis of
the Supreme Court's decision reversing that ruling will show the
rigid and restrictive interpretation the Court was forced to give to
the equal protection clause and its own precedents in order to justify
its position.
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion of the Court begins with an account
of the historical development of the Texas public school financing
system and a brief comparison between plaintiffs' school district,
Edgewood, and Alamo Heights, "the most affluent school district in
San Antonio.""4 This comparison shows that in 1967-1968 Edgewood,
with the highest equalized tax rate in the San Antonio metropolitan
area, received a state-local total of $248 per pupil,41 while the same
total for Alamo Heights was $558 per pupil.46 Although noting that
more recent statistics showed a marked increase in state funds made
3 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971); see also Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
3337 F.Supp. 280 (W.D. Tcx. 1971).
3ld. at 284.
40 Id.
41Id- at 283 n. 11.
' San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 406 U.S. 1966 (1972), probs. juris. noted.
4 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez .. U.S... ,93 S.Ct. 1278, 1282-85 (1973).
4 d. at 1285.
45 Id.
4 Id. at 1286.
1973]
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available to Edgewood,4 ' Powell had to admit that Alamo Heights had
enjoyed an even larger gain in state aid. He also recognized the
existence of substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures
throughout the state which were "largely attributable to differences
in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation."49
In order to decide whether or not these disparities amounted to
a denial of equal protection as the district court had found, the Su-
preme Court first had to determine the proper test to apply to the
Texas system 0° That determination was not a difficult one for the
majority to make. Powell stated early in his opinion that;
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted
dual system of financing education could not withstand the
strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropri-
ate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with
fundamental constitutional rights or that involve suspect
classifications.51
If the strict scrutiny test were found to be applicable, the effect, as
noted by Powell, would be that not only the Texas system, but "its
counterpart in virtually every other state will not pass muster." 2
Therefore, it was obvious almost from the start that a majority of
the Court had determined that a more lenient test had to be employed.
In order to justify his refusal to apply the strict scrutiny test
that had been used by the numerous courts that had previously de-
cided cases such as this, Powell had to find that:
1) No suspect classification was involved.
2) Education is not a fundamental interest.
The strained process by which these findings were reached is detailed
below.
Nature of the Classification
Powell, writing for the Court, stressed that, in contrast to the pre-
cedents, this case could not be "neatly fitted into the conventional mo-
saic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. .
dId. at 1286 n. 35.
49d. at 1287.
so Id. at 1288.
1 ld. at 1287. The Supreme Court clearly indicated that it considered wealth classifications ap-
propriate for strict scrutiny when it said in McDonald v. Board of Ele., 394 U.S. 802, 807
(1969) : "And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race ... two factors which would independently render a
classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." [cita-
tions omitted].
R Id. at 1288.
53id.
[Vol. 22:585
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and yet he was concerned that the class represented by the plaintiffs
could not "be identified or defined in customary equal protection
terms." 4 In an attempt to better delineate the class, Powell then
listed three ways by which he believed the disadvantaged class might
be described. 5 His first two possibilities described the class on the
basis of personal wealth of either an absolute or a relative nature.
His third proposed description was based on residence in a relatively
poor school district without regard to an individual's personal wealth.
Although acknowledging the fact that the plaintiffs and the district
court had relied primarily upon the third description of the disad-
vantaged class,56 Powell went to great lengths to show that the first
two were not valid classifications for equal protection purposes. In
the process, he was forced to resort to unreasonable interpretations
of the precedents and the equal protection clause itself.
Powell found that the Supreme Court's prior wealth discrimina-
tion cases had required a class of plaintiffs who were "completely
unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they
sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit." 7 Thus he found that Griffin v. Illinois- involved
the absolute deprivation of a transcript to an indigent criminal
defendant, and that Douglas v. California5' involved the absolute
deprivation of counsel to an indigent seeking appeal from a state
criminal conviction. Therefore, the reasoning continued, it neces-
sarily follows that since the plaintiffs in this case did not show that
their lack of personal resources resulted in their being absolutely
deprived of an education, these precedents and others cited," were
not controlling. 1
There is no justification for such an extremely narrow reading
of these cases and the conclusions drawn from such an interpreta-
tion of them is totally without merit. What was really at issue in
both Griffin and Douglas, of course, was the constitutionality of state
laws that made the meaningfulness of the opportunity to have appel-
late review dependent upon the wealth of the one seeking it. If the
defendant seeking review could not afford a transcript or counsel,
the state laws in question did not absolutely deprive him of his right
m1d. at 1289.
ss 1d.
561d. n. 51.
57d. at 1290.
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
19372 US. 353 (1963).
61 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Both of
these cases held criminal sanctions requiring incarceration of criminal indigents unable to
pay a fine, invalid. Bullock v. Carter, '105 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating Texas primary
election filing fee requirement).
6, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, --- U.S. 93 SCr. 1278, 1290-92 (1973).
1973]
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to appellate review. There simply were no provisions in those laws to
provide such services to those who could not afford them. The Su-
preme Court, however, recognized that in reality the right to appel-
late review was far less meaningful to a poor defendant than to one
who could afford to get a transcript or to retain counsel. Therefore,
it decided that those state laws were unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection. Admittedly, the Texas financing system has not
absolutely deprived the plaintiffs of an opportunity to receive an edu-
cation. It is undeniable, however, that it does make that opportunity
far less meaningful to those students, such as the plaintiffs who live
in property-poor school districts. Thus, in keeping with the rule
established by the precedents, it should have been found that the
Texas system denied plaintiffs their right to equal protection of the
laws.
Therefore, it is obvious that there is no real merit in Powell's
strained attempt to distinguish this case from the Court's earlier
wealth discrimination cases. Furthermore, the establishment of a
precedent for an absolute deprivation requirement in such cases as
this will so limit the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause as
to effectively reduce it to a meaningless phrase.
Having enunciated his newly-established absolute deprivation
requirement, Powell went on to point out that a mere showing that
pupils living in poorer districts receive a poorer quality education
does not establish a violation of the equal protection clause. After
all, he reminds us, "the Equal Protection Clause does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."" There is no chal-
lenge to this latter statement, and the prior cases that decided the
school funding issue did not require absolute equality in education.
As stated earlier," they required only that a state may not make the
extent of educational opportunity a function of the assessed property
wealth of the school district. Powell, however, was perfectly content
to overlook the admittedly wide disparities in available revenues
caused by the Texas system and rely on Texas' assertion that it pro-
vides an "adequate" education for all children in the State." In so
doing, he not only established a precedent that will require the Court
in the future to determine the adequacy of other state services, but,
much worse, he has converted (or perverted) the equal protection
clause into an adequate protection clause.
62 Id. at 129 1.
'1 Milliken '. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457, 472 (1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
334 FSupp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971).
64 See text at footnotes 23-38 wppra.
65 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez- ._.-U.S- -- --- 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1291-92 (1973).
[Vol. 22:585
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No longer will a state be required to provide its services on a
substantially equal basis to all of its citizens. Henceforth, when a
state decides to provide a service, it will need only to assure that
it makes that service available to all its citizens on some basic,
minimal level that the Court would find adequate. Having assured
this, it can then create arbitrary classifications of its citizens and
provide substantially greater degrees of this service to some of them
based on these classifications. The result of this, of course, is that
the equal protection clause has been stripped of its meaning and
of its effectiveness.
The worst aspect of Powell's acceptance of this "adequacy"
argument is that the Supreme Court has now adopted the same posi-
tion that was advocated for so many years by those in favor of main-
taining the doctrine of separate but equal schools." Even before the
Brown decision, the Supreme Court rejected this position and recog-
nized that it could not merely rely upon the state's assertion that its
separate educational facilities were "adequate" when obviously great
disparities existed."7 What the fourteenth amendment demands is
equal protection of the laws. To strive for anything less is to do a
grave injustice to the citizens of every state and to the integrity of
the Constitution.
In a further attempt to refute the validity of the first two of
his possible descriptions of the disadvantaged class, Powell relied on
his determination of the applicability of two surveys. The first was
an analysis, taken from a law review note," which claimed to show
that in Connecticut poor families do not necessarily live in property-
poor school districts. Even if it is assumed that what may be true in
Connecticut is true in Texas, it is sufficient to repeat that neither the
plaintiffs nor the district court relied on this definition of the dis-
advantaged class. The second survey was contained in an affidavit
submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Edu-
cational Finance Policy Institute.61 Professor Berke's survey was a
sample of Texas school districts, and showed a positive correlation
between school district wealth and levels of per-pupil expenditures.
7t
See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US. 629, 632-33 (1950) (reversing the state courts finding
that the law school created by the state of Texas for black law students was substantially
equivalent to the one provided for white students and ordering plaintiff's admission to the
white law school); Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F.Supp. 948, 952 (E.DS.C. 1947)
(holding that South Carolina either had to admit plaintiff to its only existing law school or
to create another facility within the state to provide him with an adequate legal education) ;
Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) (holding that Boston could require
plaintiff to attend a separate school for black children despite the fact that the nearest school
was one for white children).
1S weatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
6Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battler and
Losing Wars, 61 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972).
69 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez- ...... U.S ....... 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1292 (1973).
701d. at 1292-93.
1973]
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It also showed, in the highest and lowest ranges, a similar correla-
tion between a district's wealth and the personal wealth of its resi-
dents. " Powell and the majority disagreed with the conclusions that
the district court had drawn from this survey;" but once again it
should be noted that the disputed portions of this survey were not
crucial to the plaintiffs' claim or to the district court's decision.
The Court finally reached the classification definition which it
had earlier acknowledged 73 as the real basis for this claim and the
district court's decision -district wealth discrimination. It took
Powell only two paragraphs to dispense with this classification. He
simply said:
.. it is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend
its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly
discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class,
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts
that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. 4
It is ironic to note that the Court has now held in effect that resi-
dence in a poor school district is a valid basii for determining the
extent of a child's educational opportunity, but not a valid basis for
determining that child's ability to challange the system which makes
that determination.
It also should be pointed out that in a prior case in which the
only common factor was residence in districts that happened to have
less per-capita representation in the state legislature, 75 the Court was
willing to extend its "most exacting scrutiny" to review a system that
was found to discriminate against a class no less "large, diverse,
and amorphous" than that represented by the plaintiffs in this case.
Powell made no attempt to distinguish between these two, obviously
parallel, cases. He also completely overlooked the important fact that
discrimination based on district wealth is in some ways even more
invidious than that based on personal wealth. It can be argued that
individual wealth is much more subject to individual control than is
district wealth. Therefore, even though neither is a valid basis for
differential treatment, it is arguably less reasonable for the state to
condition a child's educational opportunity on the wealth of his neigh-
bors than on that of his parents. If it is contended that this problem
can be solved by moving to a richer district, this not only denies
71d.
7Id. at 1293.
13d. at 1289 n.51 .
71d. at 1294.
7' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the equal protection clause requires
that both houses of the Alabama Legislature be apportioned on a population basis).
[Vol. 22:585
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reality, but also raises other constitutional issues such as interference
with the right to travel.7' The majority, of course, chose not to face
these questions. Powell simply concluded that "the Texas system does
not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class" n and
moved on to consider the next issue.
Fundamentality of Education
The plaintiffs realized that state legislation establishing classi-
fications based on wealth has been subjected to strict scrutiny only
when it affects a fundamental right, and they contended that the right
to an equal educational opportunity is a fundamental one." A majority
of the Supreme Court Justices did not agree, however.79 Once again,
they resorted to a very restrictive approach to the equal protection
clause and an unreasonable narrow reading of the precedents.
In the opinion of Powell and the Justices concurring with him,
neither the importance of the service performed by the state80 nor a
nexus between that service and some accepted constitutional interest"
determines its fundamentality. Rather, the test of whether an interest
is to be regarded as "fundamental" for purposes of examination under
the equal protection clause, is whether that interest is explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 2 This test, however, fails
to provide an adequate explanation for those cases that have applied
a strict standard of review to state legislation affecting such interests
as procreation, 8 state appellate review,m and voting in state elections 5
- none of which can be found in the text of the Constitution. Cases
such as these simply cannot be fit into the rigid framework of the
majority's analysis of the equal protection precedents. Powell also
failed to make any real effort to reconcile his position on the funda-
76See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, -- U.S-.._, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1342 n.83
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77 d. at 1294.
nId.
79 Id. at 1299.
80 Id. at 1295.
81 Id. at 1298-99.
01 Id. at 1297.
'3 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex, rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (declaring unconstitutional
the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act which excluded offenses from its terms
while including others of the same quality). It is interesting to note that, although this case
was decided 25 years before the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticat, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Powell states that:
Implicit in the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation is
among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution. San Antonio
Indep, School Dist. v. Rodriguez, ._U.S_. 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297 n. 78 (1973).
"Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Harper v. Virginia d. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring the Virginia poll tax of
$1.50 unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
1973]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
mentality of education with the Supreme Court's opinions in several
cases decided both before86 and after8 7 Brown v. Board of Education88
in which it recognized the vital role of education in a free society.
A far better interpretation of the Court's prior rulings in equal
protection cases, and a determination of the proper standard of re-
view to be applied in a given case, is contained in Mr. Justice Mar-
shall's dissenting opinion:
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to
which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on
interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the non-
constitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional
interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judi-
cial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.8'
A test such as this not only adequately accounts for prior Supreme
Court decisions; it also provides the flexibility that is necessary to
meet changing circumstances in the future.
Powell's overly-restrictive definition of fundamentality, on the
other hand, both fails to account for prior decisions, and goes a long
way toward the emasculation of the equal protection clause. The
effect of the Court's ruling in this case is that state legislation will
be subjected to a strict standard of review only when it infringes on
a constitutionally guaranteed right. However, it can be argued, and
in fact has been argued,0 that such a position makes the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment mere excess constitu-
tional baggage. If the right infringed by the state is one that is
found in the Constitution, the legislation causing the infringement
can be invalidated under the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. Is the Court majority suggesting that those who drafted and
ratified the fourteenth amendment intentionally included a super-
fluous phrase? Clearly the equal protection clause was intended to
31See, e.g., Illinois ex. eel. McCallum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (finding that a
public school released-time program violated the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment where the released time was granted on condition that it be spent in religious classes
conducted in the public school building); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding unconstitutional the Oregon Compulsory Education Act of 1922 which required
all children to attend public schools).
87 See, e.g., Wisconsin v-. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state cannot compel
Amish parents to send their children to school until age 16); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (finding Bible reading and recitation of Lord's Prayer in daily opening
exercises of public school violated first amendment).
80 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8' San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, , 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1332 (1973).
"1d. at 1331 n.57 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-62
1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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protect a citizen from state action impinging those interests that are
so closely related to constitutional guarantees that it is necessary to
protect them in order to ensure the integrity of the constitutional
guarantee itself. Education, undeniably, is intimately related to such
rights and freedoms as speech and voting; but the Court held that
it is not "fundamental" because it cannot be found in the text of the
Constitution. So narrow a definition of "fundamental" could, very
possibly, have a serious effect on the future vitality of the equal
protection clause.
Finally, relying once again on his "adequacy" argument, Powell
went on to find that, even if education were a fundamental interest,
Texas furnishes enough of it to "provide each child with an oppor-
tunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and full participation in the political
process." 91 The total lack of merit in the "adequacy" argument has
already been discussed ;92 but it is important, in order to emphasize
the inappropriateness of such an argument in deciding an equal pro-
tection question, to note, as Marshall did,93 that it is of little benefit
in our highly competitive society to be assured of receiving enough
education when the state is providing others with more than enough.
Having determined that the nature of this case made it an in-
appropriate one in which to apply a strict standard of review,9 all
that remained was for the Court to find a rational relationship be-
tween the Texas financing system and some legitimate state purpose.
The district court had found no such relationship ;95 but, the Supreme
Court majority did. 6 Powell found that the purpose of the financing
scheme was to assure a basic education to every child while allowing
for a large degree of local control over education, and that the exist-
ing system accomplished that purpose.
9 7
Even if it is conceded that the real purpose of the Texas system
was to provide local control over education, it is difficult to see how
it can be seriously argued that this system is reasonably related to the
accomplishment of that objective. In the first place, it is doubtful
that there is any meaningful local control in any of the Texas school
districts. Secondly, to the extent that local school districts do control
their own affairs, that control is far less meaningful, indeed almost
meaningless, in the property-poor districts.
"1 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez - U.S .. 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1299 (1973).
92 See text at footnotes 62-67 supra.
93 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, ...US....... 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1338 n.72
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
14 d. at 1300.
9sRodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex, 1971).
" San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez- _.U.S.. , 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1308 (1973).
971d. at 1305.
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The mythological nature of the local control argument has been
revealed by several courts, 98 and very convincingly by the dissenting
Justices in this case.99 Nonetheless, Powell argued at considerable
length that Texas education is largely a local function.' It did not
matter to him that teacher qualifications, length of the school day,
and even the selection of textbooks are all matters that are deter-
mined at the state level.' 1 In fact, a reading of the list of local powers
that Powell did consider important, 2 shows them to be little more
than routine, administrative functions. It is difficult to believe that
local school authorities would lose many of those functions in even
the most highly centralized educational system imaginable. More im-
portant, however, is the fact that the plaintiffs did not attack the
idea of local control. They were not seeking a system that would put
all power in the hands of state education officials. What they were
seeking was local control for all school districts, rich and poor alike.
The majority refused to accept the obvious fact that, in reality,
if any meaningful local control does exist under the Texas system,
it exists only in those districts with sufficient revenues to enable them
to afford educational "luxuries." For a poor district, fixed costs for
such "basics" as salaries, maintenance, insurance, and retirement con-
sume such a large portion of the budget that there is very little reve-
nue that remains to be locally controlled. In addition, since a poor
district generally cannot offer competitive salaries, even the ability
to hire teachers locally loses most of its meaningfulness. The only
aspect of the system over which there is significant local control is
in determining the rate of the property tax; and there is a legal
ceiling on that, too. 3 The amount of revenue produced by that tax
rate, not the rate itself, is the crucial factor, however, and the voters
have little control over that. In reality, then, many districts are prac-
tically and legally prevented from raising revenues equal to those
raised in more affluent districts. Yet the Court has found that all of
these inequities, inherent in school financing schemes of this type,
are outweighed by Texas' asserted interest in maintaining some min-
imal degree of local control over education.
In response to the contention that the State of Texas could
achieve its purported goal of preserving local educational control by
other, less discriminatory means of school funding, Powell said:
9 See cases cited note 8 supra.
99 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez -. U.s. , 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1312-13, 1345-46
(1973) (White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
1001d, at 1305-07-
101 Id. at 1345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1021d. at 1306 n.108.
103d. at 1314.
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Only where state action impinges on the exercise of funda-
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to
have chosen the least restrictive alternative.1"
Having already decided that no fundamental rights was involved,05
the Court gave the Texas financing system a strong presumption of
constitutionality, 6 and refused to consider the validity of the meth-
ods it established to effectuate its purpose.
Additional attempts were made by Powell to justify his reluc-
tance to strictly scrutinize the Texas financing scheme, even to the
extent of portraying it as remedial legislation 1' as was involved in
Katzenbach v. Morgan."8 It was also argued that striking down this
system would affect the funding of other services such as local police
and fire protection. 9 On this point, Powell conveniently overlooked
the fact that he had stated earlier in his opinion that this case "in
significant aspects is sui generis."' 0 Powell even threw in a statement
that the Texas system is a product of purposeful studies by qualified
people, and not "the product of purposeful discrimination against any
group or class." 1 ' Perhaps that is true, but it is the effect of the legis-
lation, not its intent, that must ultimately determine its validity.
112
Finally, very near the end of his opinion, Powell made a state-
ment that really has to be read to be believed:
One also must remember that the system here challenged is
not peculiar to Texas or to any other state, In its essential
characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education
reflects what many educators for a half century have thought
was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there
is no perfect solution.
113
Id. at 1306.
105 Id. at 1299.
106Id. at 1308.
101 Id. at 1300.
105 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of §4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 despite the fact that that section rendered unenforceable a portion of the election
laws of New York requiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of soting).
'09 San Antonio Indep, School Dist. v. Rodriguez- U.S.... 93 S.Ct, 1278, 1307 (1973).
1ld. at 1288.
'i' Id. at 1308. However, at least one court has interpreted prior Supreme Court decisions quite
differently. As Judge J. Skelly Wright has stated in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 497
(D.D.C. 1967), a'd sub -nom., Smauck v, Hobso , 408 F.2d 175 (1969): "Whatever the
law once was, it is a testament to our maturing concept of equality that, with the help of
Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary
quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme."
12 See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec.,
383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
113 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez -.. ....... 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1308 (1973).
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It is impossible to read this statement without realizing that if
"reasoning" such as this had prevailed on the Supreme Court in 1954,
Brown v. Board of Education.114 would have upheld the right of a
state to maintain separate but equal schools. Neither the plaintiffs in
Brown nor the plaintiffs in Rodriguez asked the Supreme Court for
a "perfect solution," only an equitable one.
Conclusion
A careful reading of Powell's opinion in this case shows that he
very frequently refers to the fact that the financing system being
challenged is not peculiar to the State of Texas, but is, in all im-
portant respects, substantially identical to that in existence in every
state but Hawaii.115 It is readily apparent that, despite a statement
to the contrary,' the true basis for this decision lies in the practical
consideration that an affirmance of the district court's ruling would
have affected public education in virtually every state. The reluctance
to take such action seems to stem from the majority's belief that to
require change on such a scale would result in unpredictable conse-
quences.117 Not wanting to be the cause of such an upheaval, Powell
resorted to an interpretation of the equal protection clause that may
well have far more serious consequences than those he feared would
result from affirming the district court's decision.
It would be difficult at this time to predict how great an effect
this decision will have on the general area of equal protection litiga-
tion; but, unless it is restricted to its specific facts, it will undoubtedly
cause a trend away from the effective use of the equal protection
clause in eliminating wealth discrimination. It conceivably could
have long range and far reaching effects in the entire area of state
discrimination. In any event, the Court has unquestionably established
a precedent that could be used to effectively eliminate the equal pro-
tection clause as an effective constitutional means of protecting vital
individual interests from arbitrary state discrimination.
The immediate effect of this decision on the field of education
will be to further delay the much-needed reforms in state educational
funding. State legislatures have been slow to act in this area, and it
is doubtful that that will change significantly without the motivation
that could have been provided by the courts. Residents of richer school
districts, generally more influential in state legislatures than their
114347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115 San Antonio Indep, School Dist. v. Rodriguez, -----U.S-. 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288, 1304, 1308-
09 (1973).
111d, at 1309.
117Id, at 1308.
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poorer counterparts,' will be understandably reluctant to change a
system that works so much to their advantage; and, thus will con-
tribute to, or at least not discourage, legislative inactivity. Therefore,
the great interdistrict disparities in available revenues that now exist,
will continue to exist and may get much worse. The result, of course,
will be equally great disparities in the educational opportunities that
school districts will be able to offer their students.
The real hope for relief from the effects that this decision will
have on education lies not in the state legislatures, but in the state
courts. This is because, as was recently found by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill,"9 the existing school funding
scheme in a state may well be in violation of some provision of that
state's constitution, even if it does not violate the Constitution of the
United States. State constitutional challenges to these funding schemes
are not as subject to political influences as are attempts at legislative
reforms, and such challenges will undoubtedly be made in many states.
Their successes or failures will, of course, depend upon the specific
provisions of a given state constitution. Hopefully, many will be suc-
cessful; but, even if they all are, it does not change the fact that in
deciding as it did in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has retreated from
its "historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity.""'
It took the Supreme Court more than half a century to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson21 and strike down the doctrine of separate but
equal; it is hoped that the error of Rodriguez will be corrected much
more quickly.
Carl F. Nollt
118 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), afird sub nom., Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (DC. Cit. 1969).
M62 N.J. 473, 303 A-2d 273 (1973).
"
0 San Antonio Indep. School Dist., Y. Rodriguez -.....U.S ..... 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1316 (1973)
(Marshall J,, dissenting); see also Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972).
121 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
t Law Review Editor; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law,
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